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Oil and Gas Pipeline (OGP) projects face a wide range of safety and security Risk Factors 
(RFs) globally, particularly in the oil and gas producing countries having insecure 
environment and poor safety records. Inadequate information about the causes of pipeline 
failures and poor knowledge about the safety and the security of the OGP hinder efforts of 
mitigating such risks. This paper, therefore, aims to develop a risk management system that 
bases on a holistic approach of identifying, analysing and ranking the associated RFs, and 
evaluating the possible Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs), which are the first steps of this 
approach. A qualitative document analysis was adopted to design a semi-structured industry-
wide questionnaire, which was conducted to collect stakeholders‟ perceptions about existing 
RFs and RMMs for the OGP projects in Iraq. The survey results in terms of the probability 
and severity levels of the RFs were used as inputs for a computer-based risk analysis model. 
The model used the fuzzy theory to judge the probability and consequence levels of the RFs 
and rank them regards their degree of impact in the projects. The results revealed that 
terrorism, official corruption and insecure areas are the most critical risks. Similarly, the 
RMMs were evaluated based on their degree of efficacy to mitigate the risk in OGP projects. 
This paper presents a prototype of the risk management system that will be further developed 
in the next stage of the study. 
Key Words: Oil and gas pipelines (OGPs); risk probability and severity; risk index; Risk 




         
Oil and Gas Pipeline (OGP) projects face a wide range of safety and security Risk Factors 
(RFs) globally, particularly in the oil and gas producing countries having insecure 
environment and poor safety records. Inadequate information about the causes of pipeline 
failures and poor knowledge about the safety and the security of the OGP hinder efforts of 
mitigating such risks. This paper, therefore, aims to develop a risk management system that 
bases on a holistic approach of identifying, analysing and ranking the associated RFs, and 
evaluating the possible Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs), which are the first steps of this 
approach. A qualitative document analysis was adopted to design a semi-structured industry-
wide questionnaire, which was conducted to collect stakeholders‟ perceptions about existing 
RFs and RMMs for the OGP projects in Iraq. The survey results in terms of the probability 
and severity levels of the RFs were used as inputs for a computer-based risk analysis model. 
The model used the fuzzy theory to judge the probability and consequence levels of the RFs 
and rank them regards their degree of impact in the projects. The results revealed that 
terrorism, official corruption and insecure areas are the most critical risks. Similarly, the 
RMMs were evaluated based on their degree of efficacy to mitigate the risk in OGP projects. 
This paper presents a prototype of the risk management system that will be further developed 
in the next stage of the study. 
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1. Introduction 
Oil and Gas Pipelines (OGPs) provide a safe and economical mode that transports millions of 
barrels of petroleum products each day. However, despite OGPs being a safe mode of 
transportation for petroleum products, these projects are still subject to several threats that 
cause pipe failure if these threats are not effectively managed. For example, OGPs mainly 
suffer from Third-Party Disruption (TPD); corrosion; planning, design and construction 
defects; natural hazards; operational errors and unknown causes [1]. OGP projects, therefore, 
must be planned, designed, installed, operated and maintained in ways that comply with 
safety and security requirements. This is because OGPs have a severe impact on people's 
lives and projects. Thus, the stakeholders of these projects must have a robust risk mitigation 
system that can keep the RFs at the lowest level, as far as possible. 
Peng et al. [2] define TPD as any accidental damage in OGPs occurring as a result of soil 
movement (e.g. landslides and foundation collapse); surface loads that compress pipelines 
         
(e.g. illegal building, blast construction and live ground loads); natural phenomena (e.g. 
earthquakes and floods); mechanical failures (e.g. operational errors and control system 
failures) and human activities near to pipelines (e.g. road construction, farming and drilling). 
In this paper, we classify these types of TPDs as unintentional TPDs. Muhlbauer [3] 
suggested that TPD can also refer to any direct or indirect action that may be carried out 
individually, or by groups, to hinder the functionality of OGP systems such as terrorism, 
sabotage, theft and cyber-attacks on control systems. In this paper, we classify these types of 
TPDs as intentional TPDs.  
Due to current, globally insecure environments, critical infrastructures like OGPs are 
potential targets for saboteurs. Correspondingly, TPD has been recognised as one of the most 
dominant mechanisms of OGP failure globally [1]. Meanwhile, successful risk mitigation 
requires appropriate knowledge, an up-to-date database [4] and accurate risk assessment 
regarding probability and severity levels of the Risk Factors (RFs), in order to identify the 
RFs which require prioritisation. Fang and Marle [5] stated the process of risk management 
requires the following four steps.  
(I) Risk identification and registration; which means identifying the RFs that might 
threaten OGPs based on verified recorders about OGPs, such as the records of 
pipelines‟ designs, surveillance, operational pressure, pressure test, maintenance, 
modification, inspections, maps of their routes, pipeline fault and accident causes 
[6].  
(II) Risk analysis; which means assessing the RFs regarding their probability and 
severity levels [7]. One of the problems in the existing methods of risk analysis is 
these methods are not accurate enough to analyse all the RFs, which is due to the 
absence of a historical database [8].  
(III) Risk response; which means choosing the suitable Risk Mitigation Methods 
(RMMs) to mitigate the risk in OGP projects. Therefore, it is significant to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the RMMs.  
(IV) Risk monitoring and control; which is a continuing work-cycle of the previous 
steps to provide up-to-date information about the existing and new RFs and 
RMMs. However, existing risk evaluation methods are not accurate enough to 
calculate the probability of TPD RFs because a historical database has not yet 
been established [9].  
         
This research, therefore, aims to develop a holistic system of risk management that deals with 
managing the safety and the security of the OGP more effectively. Risk management systems 
are designed to provide appropriate knowledge, essential data, accurate analysis of RFs and 
an accurate evaluation of RMMs to help stakeholders successfully mitigate OGP risks. 
This paper selected Iraq as the case study area because it is amongst the most important oil 
and gas producing countries in the world. Iraq‟s crude oil reserves are the world‟s fifth-




 largest reserves [11]. 
Since 2003, there has been a high demand for more pipeline projects to meet the rapid 
increment in oil exports in Iraq [12]. However, a substantial range of RFs continuously 
affects these projects. Inadequacies regarding the management of such risk make pipeline 
failures inevitable, hindering oil export activities.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Identification and classification of the Risk Factors (RFs) in Oil and Gas 
Pipeline (OGP) projects 
With reference to Iraq, identifying the RFs in OGP projects is a challenging task due to the 
problem of the scarcity of data and the lack of information about the causes of pipeline failure 
and RMMs. Therefore, worldwide qualitative document analyses was carried out to provide a 
wide and in-depth review about RFs and RMMs in OGP projects, specifically in insecure 
environments. The review about the RFs and RMMs in OGP projects will help to identify the 
critical RFs and the commonly used RMMs in OGP projects in a way that contributes to 
overcoming the problem of the scarcity of data and the lack of information about them. For 
instant, Nnadi et al. [13] found that there are many of RFs are affecting the safety and the 
security of OGPs in Nigeria. Such as terrorism and sabotage attacks; official corruption; 
thieves; corrosion and lack of protection against it; improper inspection and maintenance; 
weak ability to identify and monitor the risks; stakeholders not paying proper attention; lack 
of proper training, shortage of modern IT services; limited warning signs; lack of risk 
registration; little research on this topic; public poverty and education level; operational 
errors; inadequate risk management; natural disasters and weather condition.  
Moreover, Rowland [14] explained the exposed pipelines (i.e. above ground pipelines) and 
threats to staff are effacing the safety and security of OGPs in Nigeria. Srivastava and Gupta 
[15] draw a scenario about a terrorist attack that might happen in India and they expect RFs 
         
like insecure areas, easy access to pipeline and hacker attacks on the operating or control 
systems might affect OGPs in their country. Other studies added more RFs like lawlessness, 
low public legal and moral awareness, and vehicular accidents [16], improper safety 
regulations; design, construction and material defects and geological risks [17], conflicts over 
land ownership [18], leakage of sensitive information [19], and animal accidents [20]. Table 
1 below summarises the findings of the literature review regards identifying the RFs that 
affect the safety and security of OGP projects in different countries, circumstances and 
environments worldwide.     
Table 1: The findings of the literature review, the identified RFs [21].   
RFs 
Terrorism & sabotage  The pipeline is easy to access  
Corruption  Limited warning signs  
Low public legal & moral awareness  Little research on this topic  
Insecure areas  Lawlessness  
Thieves  Stakeholders are not paying proper attention 
Corrosion & lack of protection against it  Public‟s poverty & education level  
Lack of proper training  Inadequate risk management methods  
Improper safety regulations  Leakage of sensitive information  
Exposed pipelines Threats to staff (kidnap or murder)  
Improper inspection & maintenance  
Operational errors e.g. human error and equipment 
failure  
Conflicts over land ownership  Geological risks like soil movement and landslides  
Shortage of the IT services & modern equipment  Natural disasters & weather conditions  
Weak ability to identify & monitor the threats  Hacker attacks on the operating or control system  
Design, construction & material defects  Vehicle accidents  
Lack of historical records about accidents and risk 
registration  
Animal accidents  
  
The RFs identified in this paper were classified into different groups based on their types. 
Several prior studies and were found to be useful when classifying the RFs in the OGP 
projects. Mubin and Manna [22] classified the RFs that affected the safety of the pipeline 
projects in Pakistan during the construction and operation stages into seven types: socio-
economic, technical, natural catastrophic, organizational, financial, environmental, and safety 
and security RFs. El-Abbasy et al. [23] classified the factors affecting pipeline conditions into 
three main groups, namely physical factors (e.g. pipes, age, diameter, metal loss, and coating 
conditions); operational factors (e.g. corrosion, operating pressure, and flow rate); and 
external RFs resulting from the environment surrounding the OGPs (e.g. traffic, weather 
conditions, TPD, and soil properties. However, these classifications of OGP RFs were broad 
and need to be more specific. Chen et al [24] divided the researches about pipeline safety into 
six parts: technical safety issues, human error/human factors, management focus on HSE, 
safety management systems, safety culture, and knowledge management/communication 
         
safety. To cover RFs that are affecting the OGP projects at all stages, we have classified the 
identified RFs according to their risk characteristics into five different groups, including 
Security and Societal (S&S); Pipeline Location (PL); Health, Safety and Environment (HSE); 
Operational Constraints (OC); and Rules and Regulations (R&R), as presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: The classification of the RFs in OGP projects in Iraq by their types [9], [25]–[29]. 
Risk Factors (RFs) Risk Type [9] 
Terrorism & sabotage  
Security & Social (S&S) 
Low public legal & moral awareness  
Thieves  
Public‟s poverty & education level  
Leakage of sensitive information  
Threats to staff (kidnap or murder)  
Corruption  
Rules and regulations (R&R) 
Lawlessness 
Stakeholders are not paying proper attention 
Lack of proper training 
Lack of historical records about accidents and risk registration 
Little research on this topic  
Insecure areas  
Pipeline Location (PL) 
The pipeline is easy to access  
Conflicts over land ownership 
Geological risks like soil movement and landslides  
Vehicle accidents  
Animal accidents  
Corrosion & lack of protection against it  
Operational constraints (OC) 
Weak ability to identify & monitor the threats  
Shortage of the IT services & modern equipment  
Design, construction & material defects 
Operational errors e.g. human error and equipment failure 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control system 
Improper safety regulations  
Health, safety and entertainment (HSE) 
Exposed pipelines 
Improper inspection & maintenance  
Limited warning signs  
Inadequate risk management methods  
Natural disasters & weather conditions  
 
2.2.Identification and classification the Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs) in 
OGP projects 
In order to make some suggestions about managing the RFs in OGP projects in Iraq, the 
investigations of the literature review were extended to identify some of the RMMs which are 
used to manage the RFs in OGP projects in different countries and geographical regions. The 
RMMs were classified according to project stages, depending on an estimate of when these 
RMMs could be applied during the project stages as follows: planning and design; 
construction; and operation and maintenance stages (see Table 3).  
         
 
Table 3: The identified RMMs in the OGP projects based on the literature review [30]. 






Anti-corrosion such as isolation & cathodic protection  √  √  
Move to an underground pipeline  √    
Advanced technological & professional remote monitoring  √  √  √  
Proper inspection, tests & maintenance    √  
Proper training  √  √  √  
Avoid insecure areas  √    
Anti-terrorism design  √  √  √  
Avoid registered risks & threats  √  √  √  
Protective barriers & perimeter fencing  √  √  √  
Government/public cooperation  √  √  √  
Warning signs & marker tape above the pipeline   √   
The RMMs mentioned in the above table are some of the methods used to manage the RFs in 
OGP projects. These methods were identified based on the literature review about them 
worldwide. The investigations about the RMMs in OGP projects will make the findings of 
this research suitable for and applicable to many countries as the RMMS were identified from 
OGP projects in different countries and environments. In addition, these methods will be used 
to make effective suggestions about risk management in OGP projects in Iraq. 
The identified RFs (Table 1) and RMMs (Table 3) in OGP projects will be used to design an 
industrial survey in order to test their degree of impact in OGP projects in Iraq.  
2.3. Risk analysis in OGP projects.  
This section of the paper reviews some of the prior studies that carried risk analysis and 
management researches in OGP projects in different countries and regions. For example, 
Mubin and Mubin [19] developed a risk management model for OGPs in Pakistan during the 
construction stage of the projects. In that model, the authors have shown the process of risk 
identification and classification based on the analysis of the local market and the review of 
the client and contractors. The authors used Monte Carlo simulation to assess the RFs and 
rank them based on their degree of impact on the projects. The final step of the model was 
about developing a data bank and proving recommendations for the risk management process. 
Schwarz et al. [22] proposed a risk management procedure to support decision-making 
processes in projects. The authors started their model by defining the project's scope and the 
criteria of risk management and identifying the RFs. Then, the authors used the Artificial 
Neural Network (ANN) and experts‟ judgment to analysis and rank the RFs. The final step of 
the model was about evaluating the RFs and supporting the decision-makers. El-Abbasy et al. 
[23,24] carried out similar work in order to assess the conditions of the OGP network in 
         
Canada and Qatar. Simlarley, El-Abbasy et al. [25] used a historical database and ANN to 
predict the conditions of offshore OGPs in Qatar and to prioritise the maintenance work in 
these projects.  
The studies that are mentioned in the above paragraphs would not be effective to manage the 
RFs in OGP projects elsewhere because of the following gaps in knowledge.  
 The findings of these studies are based on only a local review of identifying the RFs 
in the projects, while the types and characters of the RFs that affect the safety and 
security of the projects in other countries or geographical regions are different.  
 These studies used the available databases to identify the RFs in the projects. 
However, the lack of data about the RFs in the projects is making the existing models 
not effectively applicable elsewhere, particularly in developing countries. This is 
because there is no good database about the RFs that affect the safety and security of 
OGP projects in developing countries, where the documentation is not in the best 
conditions, and there are no appropriate records about the accidents in the projects.  
 These studies are limited to analysing the RFs during the operation stage of OGP 
projects. Meanwhile, there is an enormous number of RFs that affect the safety and 
security of the projects during the planning, design, and construction stages too.  
 These studies have not tried to overcome the uncertainty that results from analysing 
the RFs based only on the experts‟ judgments. This means that the results of risk 
analysis of these frameworks have a low-reliability level.   
2.4. Using fuzzy theory in risk analysis in OGP Projects 
Khan [34] made a comparison between the methods and models used in risk management, 
explaining that: “Similar to any other quantification, quantification associated with inherent 
safety assessment may also contain a certain extent of uncertainty. A fuzzy logic based 
method was developed to produce a more realistic estimation reducing the uncertainty 
associated with subjective analysis”. The section focuses on reviewing a number of past 
studies that used fuzzy theory to analyse the TPD RFs in the oil and gas industry because 
they are related to the scope of this research.   
Li et al. [35] analysed the precursor data and used the fuzzy theory to analyse and assess the 
RFs in the subsea OGPs. Using the fuzzy theory has helped to reduce the uncertainty 
associate with analysing the impact of the RFs on the projects using the qualitative analysis 
of the precursor documents only. Cheliyan and Bhattacharyya [27] and Arzaghi et al. [28] 
         
used the fuzzy fault tree to analyse the leakage risk in OGP subsea production systems. 
However, the authors of the last three mentioned studies did not make suggestions for risk 
management in the projects. 
Urbina and Aoyama [38] used fuzzy theory to reduce the uncertainty associated with 
determining the cost of risk management activities in pipeline projects and the probability 
and the severity levels of the hazards events in these projects. Innal [39] tried to reduce the 
uncertainty in safety-instrumented systems using fuzzy theory and Monte Carlo analysis. 
Keprate and Ratnayake [40] used fuzzy theory to select the best locations for fatigue-critical 
piping locations for inspection of offshore pipelines. Lu et al. [41] study used fuzzy theory to 
calculate the probability of failure for underwater gas pipeline projects undertaken by the 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). Peng et al. [2] used fuzzy theory to assess 
the TPD in OGP projects in Petro-China Gang-Zao. Fuzzy theory has enhanced the results of 
analysing the probability of accidents and the RFs. Guo et al. [42] analysed some of the 
leakage accidents occurring in OGPs in China. This study used fuzzy theory and Bayesian 
theory to overcome the problem of defining the boundaries of the RFs while analysing them 
in the pipeline projects.  
Jamshidi et al. [43]provided a systematic risk assessment framework to analyse the RFs in 
gas pipeline projects in Iran. This study used fuzzy theory as a rational way of coming up 
with precise and robust results of risk analysis. The authors suggested performing more 
quantitative analyses about the RFs (e.g. questionnaire survey and experts‟ judgements) in 
order to provide accurate inputs for their study before using fuzzy theory to analyse the RFs. 
In doing so, fuzzy theory will provide a better prediction about the probability and severity 
levels of the RFs in the projects.   
Zhang et al. [44] developed a framework in order to evaluate the performance of a petroleum 
transportation system. The framework identified and evaluated the RFs via the literature 
review and a questionnaire survey. It used linguistic evaluation and fuzzy theory to reduce 
the complexity and uncertainty involved with risk analyses using experts‟ judgements. 
However, this study evaluated the RFs based on ambiguous features and subjective 
perception, which means this study needs further research with regard to providing dynamic 
data and effective mathematical algorithms and calculations to provide more trusted inputs 
for the study.  
         
In this study, therefore, used the fuzzy theory in the process of the risk assessment in order to 
reduce the problems relating to the uncertainty of analysing and ranking the RFs based on the 
results of the survey only. 
3. Research Methodology 
This study has using a mixed methodology to analyse and rank the RFs and RMMs in OGP 
projects. Figure 1 shows the millstones and the information of this study. 
 
Figure 1: The millstones and the information of this study. 
The qualitative approach of this study involved identifying the RFs and RMMs in OGP 
projects based on the qualitative analysis of the literature review. The findings of the 
literature review, i.e. the identified RFs and RMMS were used to design a questionnaire 
survey, which was used to understand the stakeholders‟ perceptions about the “probability 
and severity” levels of the RFs and the “effectiveness” levels of RMMs.  
The quantitative part of this study is about using the results of the survey to rank the RFs 
regarding their degree of influence on OGP projects, i.e. the value of Risk Index (RI) for each 
RF. However, ranking the RFs based only on the results of the survey has some limitations of 
reflecting an accurate ranking of the RFs. Perhaps an RF has a high severity value, which 
means this RF needs urgent mitigation work before it threatens the projects. However, the 
same RF will not appear on a high rank if its‟ probability is low, and vice versa. Moreover, as 
Kraidi et al. [33, 34,35,38] concluded, uncertainty could arise during risk analysis due to data 
scarcity or incomplete information about the RFs and experts‟ judgments about them. In such 
a situation, the fuzzy theory is a useful tool that can be employed to handle risk analysis when 
         
there are no precise values and sharp boundaries [46]. Because fuzzy logic uses expressions 
and linguistic labels instead of rigid mathematical rules and equations to model the behaviour 
of a system or sub-system [47].  Therefore, this study has used the fuzzy theory to analyse 
and rank the RFs in OGP projects. 
3.1. Questionnaire Design  
In conditions of data scarcity, the RFs will be mainly identified based on the literature review. 
The impact of the identified RFs will be assessed based on stakeholders‟ judgements as they 
have real experience about them in their projects [48], [49]. This research, therefore, seeks to 
engage with stakeholders who have a better understanding of the oil and gas industry and 
have a piece of real knowledge about the problems, risks and challenges associated with 
OGPs. Most importantly, the survey aims to obtain consensus views and perceptions from the 
relevant stakeholders in a way that reflects the reality of the RFs in OGP projects.   
Questionnaire survey is one of the most widely used research methods for data collection, 
which helps in engaging with respondents or participants in the survey who are eager to 
engage and understand an attitude or a behaviour of a certain phenomenon [50], [51]. In other 
words, the questionnaire is commonly used to ask participants questions prepared by the 
researcher(s) (i.e. the surveyor(s)) to collect baseline data to be used for analysing a certain 
phenomenon later on P.E.T.C.P [52]. A previous study by Alali [53] found that around 61% 
of the research studies in the field of project management normally used surveys and 
questionnaires to collect research data for their studies. They are also used to collect desirable 
research data from the participants/stakeholders which might be unavailable elsewhere [54]. 
Thus, the questionnaire survey is utilised in this research to collect the primary research data 
about the probability and severity impact of the RFs and the potentially effective RMMs in 
the OGP projects based on the perceptions of the relevant stakeholders. 
A pilot survey was carried out to improve the clarity of the questions and revise ambiguous 
ones before distributing the final survey [55]. The snowball sampling technique for data 
collection was used to ensure the widespread distribution of the survey [39]. The participants 
were assured that their participation would be analysed confidentially. 
In the survey, the probability levels of the RFs were identified based on a scale of (1) = rare, 
(2) = unlikely, (3) = possible, (4) = likely and (5) = almost certain. Similarly, the severity 
levels of RFs were evaluated based on a scale of (1) = negligible, (2) = minor, (3) = moderate, 
(4) = major and (5) = catastrophic. To determine the values of Risk Probability (RP) and Risk 
         
Severity (RS) of each RF, the means of the five-point rating Likert scale responses were 
calculated. The results of RP and RS of the RFs are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: The probability and severity levels of the RFs in OGP projects in Iraq based on the 
results of the survey [9], [25]–[29]. 
Risk Factors (RFs) Risk Probability (RP) Risk Severity (RS) 
Terrorism & sabotage  3.995 4.490 
Corruption  3.980 4.323 
Low public legal & moral awareness  3.712 4.106 
Insecure areas  3.717 4.192 
Thieves  3.692 4.081 
Corrosion & lack of protection against it  3.687 3.990 
Lack of proper training  3.646 3.859 
Improper safety regulations  3.687 3.960 
Exposed pipelines 3.667 3.949 
Improper inspection & maintenance  3.657 3.899 
Conflicts over land ownership  3.495 3.646 
Shortage of the IT services & modern equipment  3.667 3.924 
Weak ability to identify & monitor the threats  3.631 3.848 
Design, construction & material defects  3.333 3.611 
Lack of historical records about accidents and risk registration  3.566 3.662 
The pipeline is easy to access  3.631 3.773 
Limited warning signs  3.626 3.732 
Little research on this topic  3.621 3.697 
Lawlessness  3.606 3.682 
Stakeholders are not paying proper attention 3.530 3.652 
Public‟s poverty & education level  3.449 3.611 
Inadequate risk management methods  3.227 3.505 
Leakage of sensitive information  2.980 3.399 
Threats to staff (kidnap or murder)  3.323 3.571 
Operational errors e.g. human error and equipment failure  3.101 3.409 
Geological risks like soil movement and landslides  2.747 3.182 
Natural disasters & weather conditions  2.652 3.066 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control system  3.066 3.066 
Vehicle accidents  2.465 2.970 
Animal accidents  1.894 2.020 
In the survey the effectiveness levels of RMMs were evaluated based on a scale of (1) = 
insignificant, (2) = slightly effective, (3) = moderately effective, (4) = very effective, and (5) 
= extremely effective. To determine the values of the effectiveness levels of the RMMs, the 
means of the five-point rating Likert scale responses were calculated. Table 5 explains the 
degree of efficacy of RMMs based on the results of the survey.  
  
         
 
Table 5: The effectiveness levels of the RMMs based on the results of the survey. 
Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs) The effectiveness levels of the RMMs 
Anti-corrosion such as isolation & cathodic protection 4.23 
Move to an underground pipeline 4.07 
Advanced technological & professional remote monitoring 4.0 
Proper inspection, tests & maintenance 3.83 
Proper training 3.79 
Avoid insecure areas 3.78 
Anti-terrorism design 3.78 
Avoid registered risks & threats 3.77 
Protective barriers & perimeter fencing 3.69 
Government/public cooperation 3.57 
Warning signs & marker tape above the pipeline 3.55 
Foot & vehicle patrols 3.53 
 
As shown in the table above, based on the perceptions of the stakeholders in OGP projects 
that were collected from the survey, the results of evaluating the effectiveness degree of the 
RMMs show that anti-corrosion measures, moving to an underground pipeline, and the use of 
high technology and professional remote monitoring are the most effective RMMs.  
Corrosion could be protected against by providing the pipelines with an external coating, 
using isolation layers, a cathodic protection system, or a combination of these methods. 
However, these methods are not perfect. Therefore, the condition of the coating, the isolation 
layers, and the system of cathodic protection must be periodically checked for any issues [30], 
[45]. The main disadvantage of this method is the added cost to the projects, and it might 
slow down pipeline construction and installation processes as certain protections need to be 
applied. 
Regular risk monitoring and surveys by using advanced technological and professional 
remote monitoring (e.g. aerial and satellite surveillance, remotely controlled vehicles, Global 
Positioning System (GPS), and smart camera systems) can help to investigate any 
unauthorised activities in OGP project zones such as terrorism, sabotage, thievery, illegal 
excavation, and construction activities near to the pipeline. Using these methods has a 
number of advantages, for example, surveying a large network of pipelines in a short period 
of time. The presence of these methods could serve as a deterrent against intentional TPD and 
provide quick risk prediction and alerts. These methods also enable photographs of pipelines 
to be shared between the project partners. However, they also have disadvantages including 
         
high capital investment for equipment and machinery, operational costs, and additional 
training for personnel on new software.  
Based on the survey results, foot and vehicle patrols are not effective RMMs as they are time-
consuming, do not cover large areas of the OGP network, and need to be carried out at 
frequent intervals to be effective. That said, this method has some advantages such as 
requiring a moderate capital investment for equipment and machinery, and it is effective 
against intentional or unintentional TPD during inspection periods.  
Proper operational practices, inspections and maintenance reduce operative RFs and 
mechanical failure for the pipeline. Most operators in OGP projects control operational RFs 
by limiting the operational stress (operating pressure) and following the regulations and codes. 
However, [30], [45] noticed some problems with such a procedure: (i) the regulations and 
codes are different in different areas and companies; therefore, they are not applicable to 
OGPs everywhere; (ii) this procedure might potentially miss new RFs if risk identification 
and registration process are not up to date; and (iii) this procedure creates an inflexible 
practice of risk management that restricts the stakeholders in applying new methods of 
identifying and mitigating the RFs.  
The landowners and construction workers should monitor pipelines in their areas to avoid 
carrying out farming or construction work that could damage the pipes. Providing 
communication facilities for the local population such as emergency contact (emails and 
phone numbers) and phone lines, mailboxes, and so forth) could help people to report any 
threat to a pipeline. Iraq‟s OGP network is above ground, which means that the pipelines are 
susceptible to RFs mainly related to TPD. Table 9 explains the suggestion of this study about 
mitigating the RFs in OGP projects in Iraq.  
Laying the pipelines underground is also an effective RMM, this is because the pipelines 
won‟t be easily seen or accessed by the vandals and the pipelines won‟t be subjected to car 
accidents or similar source or risk.   
On the other side, it was found that foot and vehicle patrols are not effective RMMs as they 
are time-consuming, do not cover large areas of the OGP network, and need to be carried out 
at frequent intervals to be effective. That said, this method has some advantages such as 
requiring a moderate capital investment for equipment and machinery, and it is effective 
against intentional or unintentional TPD during inspection periods. Proper operational 
         
practices, inspections and maintenance reduce operative RFs and mechanical failure for the 
pipeline. Most operators in OGP projects control operational RFs by limiting the operational 
stress (operating pressure) and following the regulations and codes. However, Hopkins [6] 
noticed some problems with such a procedure: (i) the regulations and codes are different in 
different areas and companies; therefore, they are not applicable to OGPs everywhere; (ii) 
this procedure might potentially miss new RFs if RF identification and registration are not up 
to date; and (iii) this procedure creates an inflexible practice of risk management that restricts 
the stakeholders in applying new methods of identifying and mitigating the RFs. The 
landowners and construction workers should monitor pipelines in their areas to avoid 
carrying out farming or construction work that could damage the pipes. Providing 
communication facilities for the local population such as emergency contact (emails and 
phone numbers) and phone lines, mailboxes, and so forth) could help people to report any 
threat to a pipeline. Iraq‟s OGP network is above ground, which means that the pipelines are 
susceptible to RFs mainly related to TPD. 
3.2.Analyse and rank the RFs using the fuzzy theory 
Analysing the RFs using the Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) toolbox in MATLAB has three 
stages, which are fuzzification, knowledgebase, and defuzzification (see Figure 2). (I) 
Fuzzification provides crisp inputs for the FIS. Step II of risk management „risk analyses‟ 
means assessing the RFs regarding their probability and severity levels. Therefore, RP and 
RS are the two required inputs for the FIS in this paper (see Figure 3). (II) Knowledgebase 
defines the membership functions for the inputs and outputs of the model (see Figure 3 and 
Figure 4) and the „If-Then rules‟ to control the FIS. (III) Defuzzification is about obtaining 
the final outputs of the model, which is RI in this model. In this stage of the FIS, the value of 
the RI will be calculated for the RFs depending on the range of RP and RS of each RF and 
the controlling rules of the model (see Figure 3 and Figure 4).  
 
Figure 2: The prototype computer-based risk simulation model using FIS [49]. 
Input (RP & RS)
Fuzzification Output (RI)
DefuzzificationFIS engine (Knowledge base)
Rules
Membership Function
         
 
Figure 3: The Min-Max membership function of the FIS [57]. 
 
Figure 4: Triangular fuzzy membership functions. 
To summarize this section, the model has 60 inputs data, which are 30 RP and 30 RS for the 
30 RFs; and 30 outputs, which are 30 RI for the 30 RFs. Finally, in order to highlight the 
most critical RFs in OGP projects, the RFs will be ranked regarding their values of RI 
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Table 6: The ranking of the RFs based on the results of the fuzzy theory. 
RFs Index Rank Risk Range* 
Terrorism and sabotage 3.99 1 H 
Corruption 3.87 2 H 
Low public legal and moral awareness 3.80 3 H 
Insecure areas 3.76 4 H 
Thieves 3.75 5 H 
Corrosion and lack of protection against it 3.72 6 H 
Lack of proper training 3.71 7 H 
Improper safety regulations 3.70 8 H 
Exposed pipelines 3.70 9 H 
Improper inspection and maintenance 3.69 10 H 
Conflicts over land ownership 3.68 11 H 
Shortage of IT services and modern equipment 3.68 12 H 
Weak ability to identify and monitor the risks 3.67 13 H 
Design, construction and material defects 3.64 14 H 
Lack of risk registration 3.60 15 H 
Easy access to pipeline 3.57 16 H 
Limited warning signs 3.56 17 H 
Little research on this topic 3.55 18 H 
Lawlessness 3.54 19 H 
Stakeholders not paying proper attention 3.51 20 H 
Public poverty and education level 3.49 21 H 
Inadequate risk management 3.48 22 H 
Leakage of sensitive information 3.38 23 H 
Threats to staff 3.35 24 H 
Operational errors 3.30 25 H 
Geological risks 3.17 26 H 
Natural disasters and weather conditions 3.10 27 H 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control systems 3.03 28 H 
Vehicular accidents 2.80 29 M 
Animal accidents 1.95 30 L 
*Risk Range, Very Low (VL)= [0-1], Low (L)= [1-2], Moderate (M)= [2-3], High (H)= [3-
4], and Very High (VH)= [4-5].  
The ranking of the RFs as shown in Table 6 indicated that terrorism and sabotage, corruption, 
low public legal and moral awareness, insecure areas, and theft are the most critical RFs. In 
contrast, natural disasters and weather conditions, hacker attacks on the operating or control 
systems, and accidents involving vehicles and animals are the RFs with the lowest impact on 
OGPs. 
4. Results  
4.1. Response rate  
The questionnaire survey was sent to 400 potential participants. The response rate was 49.5% 
since 198 participants responded. The response rate in this research was high compared to 
past studies. For instance, Bennett and Nair [42] and Nair [43] put the average response rate 
         
for online surveys is about 30% to 36%, which means the response rate in this research is 
more than the expected rate. This rate is good compared to Okaro [60] with a response rate of 
33% and 82 participants, and Rowland [14] with a response rate of 23% and 151 participants. 
4.2. The demographic information of the participants  
Table 7 explains the demographic information of the participant. 
Table 7: The frequency of participants‟ occupation, experience and degree of education.  
Occupation Experience (Years) Education 
Consultant, planner or designer 14 Less than 5  74 Vocational or craftsman 3 
A member of a construction team 71 5 to 10  67 High school or Diploma 28 
An operator 41 10 to 15  29 Bachelor‟s degree  106 
An owner or client 39 More than 15  28 Masters or PhD 61 
A researcher 33     
As shown in Table 7 above, according to the participants‟ occupations, as recorded in the 
survey, 14 participants were consultants, planners or designers, 71 were members of 
construction teams, which means executive engineers, 41 were operators, 39 were owners or 
clients, and 33 were either researchers or postgraduate students associated with the OGP 
projects. The students are employed in the OGP projects and at the same time studying for 
their master‟s or PhD, which means they have experience of working on these projects. In 
terms of participants‟ experience, 74 have between one and five years of experience in OGP 
projects, 67 have five to 10 years, 29 participants have 10 to 15 years, and 28 of them have 
more than 15 years of experience. In respect of the participants‟ education, three of them 
were vocational or crafts-based, 28 have a high school or a diploma degree, 106 have a 
bachelor‟s degree (engineers), and 61 have a master‟s or a PhD degree. The appropriate 
sampling of the targeted population, as shown in the table above, enhances the results of this 
research because all the stakeholder categories during all stages of a project were represented 
in the survey. 
4.3. The reliability level of the survey 
Cronbach‟s alpha correlation coefficient (α) (Table 8) was calculated to test the level of 
reliability of the survey and the average internal consistency of survey items [61] where a 
coefficient of 0.7 indicates a minimum level of reliability [62].  Cronbach‟s alpha is not 
applicable for the first three questions asked for demographic information of the participants. 
 
         
 
 
Table 8: The case processing summary of Cronbach‟s alpha correlation coefficient (α). 
Case Processing Summary Valid Excluded Valid % α 
The whole questionnaire 198 0 100 0.910 
The question of analysing the RP of the RFs  198 0 100 0.919 
The question of analysing the RS of the RFs 198 0 100 0.863 
The question of analysing the effectiveness levels of the RMMs 198 0 100 0.792 
  
4.4.The suggested RMMs  
Managing and mitigating the risk factors in these OGP projects is not limited to one stage of 
the project. Therefore, different risk mitigation methods were suggested to mitigate the risk 
during the project‟s entirety. Based on the survey results, anti-corrosion measures such as 
isolation and cathodic protection were rated as effective RMMs.  
Depending on the character of the risk factor, a number of RMMs were suggested to manage 
each one of the RFs. For example, avoiding insecure areas, using an anti-terrorism design, 
having protective barriers and patrols could mitigate the risk of terrorism & sabotage by 
direct action. Meanwhile, laying the pipelines underground can help with minimising the 
opportunities for terrorists and saboteurs to attack them. However, terrorists and vandals still 
have an opportunity to damage the pipelines. Educating government/public corporations 
about managing the safety of OGPs and reporting any case of vandalism could reduce 
pipeline attacks, but the government cannot entirely stop terrorists and vandals from attacking 
the pipelines. From these examples, the RMMs were classified into direct and indirect 
RMM(s) in the way that the RMM(s) will mitigate the RFs. In a case where the RF has more 
than one RMM to manage it, the RMMs were ranked based on their degrees of effectiveness 
that were collected via the survey. Table 9 illustrious the suggested RMMs in order to 
mitigate the risk in OGP projects. 
  
         
 
Table 9: The suggested RMMs in order to mitigate the risk in OGP projects. 
RFs  The suggested RMMs 
The RMMs that have a direct action to 
manage the RFs 
The RMMs that have an indirect action to 




 Theft of the 
products  
 Insecure areas 
1. Avoid the insecure areas. 
2. Anti-terrorism design. 
3. Use protective barriers and perimeter 
fencing 
4. Use a high technology and advanced 
risk-monitoring system. 
5. Government-public cooperation. 
6. Foot and vehicle patrols. 
7. Use the rivers and lakes to extend the 
pipelines in the insecure areas despite 
the construction cost and the risk of 
corrosion. 
1. Use underground pipeline.  
2. Expand the protection zones along with 
the pipelines and remove the random 
buildings and unauthorised activities in 
the pipeline production zones. 




Government-public cooperation. 1. Use protective barriers and perimeter 
fencing. 
2. Expand the protection zones along with 
the pipelines and remove the random 
buildings and unauthorised activities in 
the pipeline production zones. 
Threats to staff 1. Avoid insecure areas. 
2. Foot and vehicle patrols. 
Government-public cooperation.  
The pipeline is 
easy to access 
1. Use underground pipeline.  
2. Use a high-technology and advanced 
risk-monitoring system. 
3. Use protective barriers and perimeter 
fencing. 
4. Foot and vehicle patrols. 
5. Expand the protection zones along 
with the pipelines. 
6. Use the rivers and lakes to extend the 
pipelines in the insecure areas. 





1. Anti-corrosion such as isolation and 
cathodic protection. 
2. Extend the pipes inside concrete 
pipes. 
Proper inspection, tests and maintenance. 
Vehicle accidents 1. Use underground pipeline. 
2. Use protective barriers and perimeter 
fencing.  
3. Warning signs. 
4. Choose the pipeline routes accurately 
to avoid the traffic areas. 
Expand the protection zones. 
Animal accidents 
on the pipeline 
1. Use underground pipeline. 
2. Use protective barriers and perimeter 
fencing. 
Expand the protection zones. 
Corrosion and 
lack of protection 
against it 
1. Anti-corrosion such as isolation & 
cathodic protection. 
2. Extend the pipes inside concrete 
1. Proper inspection, tests and maintenance. 
2. Use high-quality pipes and spare parts. 
3. Do not use pipes older than the design 
         
pipes. 
3. Use optimisers and remove the salts 
and metals before pumping the 
petroleum products. 
4. Pump only one type of product in the 
pipeline and use a different pipeline 
for each oil field. 
age. 
The weak ability 
to identify and 
monitor the 
threats 
1. Use a high-technology and advanced 
risk-monitoring system. 
2. Proper inspection, tests and 
maintenance. 
3. Proper training. 
4. Record pipeline accidents and risks in 
order to avoid them in the future. 
All of the RMMs could be used to improve 
the ability to identify and monitor the RFs in 
OGP projects.  










1. Proper training. 
2. Make studies about the safety of the 
pipelines and follow the new research 
about risk management. 
3. Use high-quality pipes and spare 
parts. 
4. Choose well-known design 
companies to minimise design errors. 
5. Choose well-known construction 
companies to minimise construction 
defects.  
Do not use pipes older than the design age. 
Operational errors 1. Choose well-known construction 
companies to minimise construction 
defects. 
2. Commit to the operating standards. 
(e.g. do not pass the design capacity). 
3. Use optimisers and remove the salts 
and metals before pumping the 
petroleum products. 
4. Pump only one type of product in the 
pipeline and use a different pipeline 
for each oil field. 
All of the RMMs could be used to manage 
the RFs in OGP projects during the operation 
stage. 
Lack of  
appropriate 
training 
Proper training. Record pipeline accidents and risks in order 
to avoid them in the future. 
Conflicts over 
land ownership 
1. Choose the pipeline routes accurately 
to avoid conflicts over land 
ownership. 
2. Taking future urban planning into 
account. 
 
Salt and metal 
contents in the 
transported 
products such as 
silver 
Use optimisers and remove the salts and 
metals before pumping the petroleum 
products. 
 
         
The pipes are 
older than the 
design age 
Do not use pipes older than the design 
age. 
 




Taking future urban planning into 
account. 
 




Choose the pipeline routes accurately to 
avoid natural disasters. 
 
Few researchers 
are dealing with 
this problem 
Make studies about the safety of the 
pipelines and follow the new research 
about risk management. 
 
Lack of risk 
registration 
Record pipeline accidents and risks in 










1. The stakeholders in different levels 
should pay the  appropriate attention 
to the risk management in their 
projects.  
2. Follow and commit to the operating 











1. All the methods.  
The aboveground 
pipelines increase 
sabotage and theft 
opportunities, as 
they are easy to 
access 
1. Move to an underground pipeline. 
2. Foot and vehicle patrols. 
3. Use the rivers and lakes to extend the 
pipelines in the insecure areas despite 
the construction cost and the risk of 
corrosion.  
1. Use a high technology and advanced 
risk-monitoring system. 
2. Use protective barriers and perimeter 
fencing. 
3. Warning signs and marker tape above the 
pipeline 
4. Expand the protection zones along with 
the pipelines and remove the random 
buildings and unauthorised activities in 
the production zones of the pipeline. 
Limited warning 
signs 





All the methods.  
Pumping more 
than one type of 
petroleum product 
and crude oil 
from different 
fields in the same 
pipe 
Pump only one type of product in the 
pipeline and use a different pipeline for 
each oil field. 
 
         
5. Discussions  
The comprehensive review of literature suggested a list of RFs and a list of RMMs associated 
with the OGP projects in different countries across the world. Identifying OGP RFs and 
RMMs based on a wide-ranging review provides accurate and appropriate knowledge about 
the safety and security of pipelines. Collecting information from various and trusted sources 
i.e., government agencies, academic organisations and professionals (e.g. consultants, 
planners, designers, operators and researchers) will provide „real‟ information for future 
pipeline risk management. This also ensures a more accurate and reliable analysis of OGP 
RFs and RMMs as the information has been gathered by field-experienced individuals. The 
survey results were found to be reliable as all α values are above 0.7 (Table 8), an appropriate 
sampling of the targeted population (Table 7) enhancing the results.  
Using the fuzzy theory to analyse the RFs in the project could be improved by paying more 
attention towards the fact that the fuzzy theory-based expert system applies an imprecise term 
that could lead to poor performance in many situations, where identifying the risk level of 
OGP stations includes many overlapping variables changing over time. This does not really 
assess the risk level in such big projects and can affect decision-making as well as the validity 
and reliability of decisions made by such systems. Consequently, we recommend taking a 
step forward and considering sophisticated, intelligent approaches to identify the risk levels 
of such big projects. In our upcoming study that will be available online soon, we are 
applying a set of machine-learning methods for the same purpose. In other words, machine 
learning algorithm will be used to link the RFs in OGP with their cost and time impact on the 
projects. Using a machine-learning algorithm within the process of ranking and classifying 
the RFs will make the framework works as an automated decision-making tool, which could 
be used while planning for pipelines‟ maintenance in OGP projects. Based on the process of 
three hidden layers of machine learning algorithm, the main output of the framework is a 
prioritised/focused RFs, which will make the risk management plans more effective by 
focusing on the most influential of pipelines‟ failure causes. 
This research‟s findings and recommendations are suitable and applicable for OGPs in Iraq 
and many other countries under similar situations. OGP stakeholders could use this research‟s 
findings to improve risk management during the pipeline projects' stages. Moreover, the 
findings of this paper could be applied to mitigate the risk in other critical infrastructures 
such as water supply network; transportation system (e.g. railway, highways, fuel supply, 
         
etc.); energy supply infrastructure (e.g. transmission and distribution lines, nuclear power 
generators, etc.); telecommunication and communication facilities; etc. The RFs may be 
different in these projects, but insecure situations cause similar types of risks. Therefore, the 
methodology for identifying and evaluating the RFs and RMMs could also be similar.  
Suggesting, recommending and/or identifying effective RMMs to manage the risk factors in 
the projects should be done based on an extensive review through the project stages. In other 
words, the perceptions of the manufacturers, the designers, the inspections and the operators 
should be collected and analysed in order to enhance the safety and security levels of the 
pipelines continually. This is because: (i) the impact of the risk factors changes as time passes, 
(ii) there are always new risk factors arising in the projects and (iii) the methods of risk 
management are continually improved. This means that the stakeholders and researchers 
should be prepared and updated about: (i) analysing and reanalysing the existing risk factors, 
(ii) revaluating the existing RMMs with regard to their effectiveness degree in the projects, 
(iii) analysing the newly arising risk factors, (iv) using new RMMs. Therefore, continuous 
extensive interviews and focus group studies with relevant experts in the projects should be 
conducted in order to recommend a robust system of risk management in the OGP projects.  
6. Conclusions 
A list of 30 RFs and 12 RMMs in the oil and gas pipeline projects have been identified based 
on a comprehensive review of the pipeline failure causes and risk management in the OGP 
projects worldwide. These findings help in overcoming the problems of the shortage of 
important data and intelligent information for the potential risk management processes in the 
OGP projects. In conclusion, there are only a few studies that have concurrently examined all 
potential pipeline RFs.  There is the need for an accurate evaluation of the RFs, specifically 
regarding the issue of intentional TPD, because these factors have not been accurately 
evaluated in the past. The survey results, which are based on the fuzzy theory, have identified 
various risks, which are critical cause the pipelines failures. The TPD is recognised as one of 
the most prevailing risks obstructing OGP systems and the development of new OGP projects. 
Attention needs to be paid to what motivates intentional TPD. The study provides some 
suggestions and recommendations for the risk mitigation methods in the OGPs might help in 
reducing the impact of the RFs in the OGP projects. The findings and recommendations of 
this paper are relevant for the management of risks in the OGP particularly in Iraq and other 
countries having similar circumstances. However, the degree of impact of the RFs and the 
         
effectiveness levels of the RMMs might vary in different projects and locations with local 
risks. Hence, it is recommended that future study must involves distributing a wide range of 
questionnaire according to region/country in order to provide useful 
suggestions/recommendations for the effective risk management system in that 
region/country.  
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